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Marginalization of Ethnic Communities and the Rise in Radicalization

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Abstract. Renewed marginalization, coupled with ethnic nationalism, could severely hamper peace, stability, governance, and the delivery of essential service to the people. Therefore, disharmony resulting from marginalization and regional discontent is no more dismissible issues. Muslim communities in Africa, South Asia, and some parts of the Middle East are considered to be highly underprivileged in terms of representation, economic prospects, and education. This exclusion has made young Muslims particularly vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist insurgents who appear to sympathize with their plight. The terrorists usually offer them possible alternatives to earn income and to express their grievances. Since the stability of any society largely depends on political, security, and economic freedom, communities that do not attain it, are likely to be vulnerable to recruitment by insurgent groups that meet their needs. This study examined how Somali Muslims' perceptions of marginalization influenced their radicalization in Kenya. A total of 400 respondents were sampled from a target population of 623,060. Sixty respondents were Muslim religious leaders in Garissa county, 40 respondents were law enforcement personnel working in Garissa County, 100 respondents were government officials in administrative offices within the County, and 200 respondents were local Somali youths aged between 17–35 years. Data was collected from the respondents through the administration of the questionnaires in hard copy form. The split-half method was employed to guarantee reliability of the survey, while validity was addressed by phrasing all survey and FGD questions appropriately in line with the research objectives. The collected data was then examined using quantitative and qualitative analysis methods. The quantitative analysis focused on numerical data, while qualitative analysis was used to analyze non-numerical information provided by respondents. In analyzing Somali Muslim views on marginalization and its effect on radicalization, this study employed correlation research design and Samuel Stouffer's relative deprivation theory of social behaviour. The findings of this study indicate that the perceptions of marginalization by Somali Muslims are related to an upsurge in radicalization.

Keywords: extremism; marginalization; radicalization; social exclusion.

INTRODUCTION

The problem of radicalization of Muslims in many developing countries and some parts of western nations by global terrorist groups is a significant concern. Increasingly, marginalized Somali Muslims in Kenya are joining terrorist insurgency networks such as the Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) [1]. However, this trend is not an isolated phenomenon. Turkmani R. argues that in the United States

and some parts of Western Europe, disenchanted youths are progressively resorting to extremism to gain acceptance, identity, and purpose, which they do not find in their local communities [25]. Perceptions of marginalization appear to influence youth affiliation to extremist groups largely.

The marginalization of specific ethnic communities has been linked to extremism. A study by Abrahams J. [2] found that young Muslims' marginalization and social inequality increased their radicalization and their tendency to join extrem-

ist groups. The study focused on young people aged between 16 and 24 years who were either unemployed or underemployed. The report found that marginalization increased feelings of frustration and apathy. These feelings catalyzed the radicalization of Muslim youths.

Similarly, Woodhams K. [26] examined the role of social network analysis in preventing violent extremism and radicalization. Woodhams K. found that social and political marginalization were push factors that increased the likelihood of radicalization by young Muslims. The study further found that nations that marginalized certain groups through economic, social, and political exclusion provided an enabling environment for radicals to recruit disenfranchised youths successfully. The implication is that community-level factors, including how perceived targets of social, political, and economic exclusion view their circumstances, play a critical role in influencing youth involvement with extremist groups.

Muslim communities in Africa, South Asia, and some parts of the Middle East are considered to be the most underprivileged in terms of representation, economic prospects, and education [26]. This exclusion has made young Muslims particularly vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist insurgents, who appear to sympathize with their plight and offer them possible alternatives to earn income and to vent their grievances. Since the stability of any society largely depends on political, security, and economic freedom [26], terrorists might target unstable communities by addressing their economic, security and social needs. Moreover, the potentially discriminatory impact of counter-terrorism laws and policies on Muslim societies in Europe and other Western countries is a subject that continues to herald various debates among experts [7]. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (EUAFR) documented a report which found that intolerance towards the Muslim community was gaining increasing concerns and was manifested in various ways, including social marginalization and discrimination. The report further found that such prejudice was a great hindrance to community cohesion and integration across member States.

Many discourses on terrorism portray radicalization as an essential theme. Radicalization refers to a process in which extremist beliefs and ideologies are developed [21]. Radicalization is often a psychosocial process that entails steady ad-

vancement from physical setting to ideas and eventually to behaviour. Most literature provides a conceptual rather than empirical evidence of radicalizations into terrorism (see, for example, [1, 10, 21]). A more nuanced comprehension of the radicalization process is crucial in understanding how social exclusion influences the perceptions of marginalized groups. While the exact sequence of radicalization is debatable, several theories have been advanced to explain this progression. Studies have sought to examine the critical influencers of radicalization among marginalized communities.

For example, Fishman S. [10] found that economic measures predisposed marginalized communities to radicalization. Some of the economic measures that he studied include unemployment rates, income inequality, involvement in government help programs, social capital, political exclusion, and social support, such as the number of services that are available to communities. Fishman explained that social capital included aspects such as single-parent families and divorce rates, while political exclusion included participation in local campaigns and elections. Fishman's findings indicate that community-level factors significantly influence radicalization. Other studies have examined specific factors that influence the radicalization of marginalized communities. For example, a survey by Angus C. [4] examined features of socio-economic grievances such as poverty and unemployment. The study found that there was a significant relationship between poverty and radicalization among Muslims. Young Muslims living in poverty were likely to be radicalized by the offer of employment and high status. Based on these findings, the study concluded that perceived grievances, which facilitated the radicalization of members of specific marginalized communities, were intensified by feelings of perceived systematic injustice directed at marginalized communities [1]. Özerdem A. and Podder S. [21] also found that extremist groups' grievances and feelings of exclusion influenced the recruitment of youth combatants.

The probability that extremist factions will radicalize marginalized groups is linked to several conditions. The extent to which specific communities felt that they were excluded or included in a broader community influenced their likelihood of being radicalized. Woodham K. [26] posits that communities deprived of resources and experienced considerable social disruption exhibited

higher rates of radicalization. People's desire to belong has also been suggested as another possible reason for their involvement in radicalization. Marginalized communities may seek viable alternatives to meet their desire for inclusion and acceptance, and in many cases, terrorist groups present themselves as the necessary substitute.

Several theories have been suggested to explain the process of radicalization. According to the Relative deprivation theory terrorists are generally not poor or drawn from a more impoverished socio-economic background. Berman E. [6] argues that deprivation is relative, not merely regarding pertinent others, but also comparative to individuals' self-expectations and earlier fulfillments. Therefore, Berman E. claims that people who have improved living standards tend to overemphasize the pace with which they want their lives to advance. Consequently, a gap occurs between individuals' expectations and reality. The resultant frustration escalates the probability of social turbulence and radical temperaments.

Suggestions have been made that fundamentalism and antagonism are predominant among outwardly well-integrated and exceedingly accomplished Muslim minority members [16]. Seemingly, those minority members belonging to developed socio-economic backgrounds have extraordinary expectations regarding socio-economic prosperity and integration. At the same time, they also seem more likely to be challenged with institutional marginalization (real or perceived), which prevents integration and social mobility. Those seen to be integrated might discover that their anticipations are frustrated, which may lead to experiences of rejection as well as exclusion from society [15]. A subcategory may show a biological preference for instrumental aggression.

METHODOLOGY

This study used correlational research design to gather data from various respondents selected among the various residents of Garissa Town. Correlation research design was preferred since it enables a researcher to determine the effect of one variable (independent) on another variable (dependent) [5]. Since this study was meant to examine how marginalization of Somali Muslim communities in Kenya contributes to their radicalization, the approach was suitable as it would

enable an in-depth inquiry about the situation from the concerned people.

This study was confined to Garissa County and the unit of analysis was all local residents of Garissa County. Garissa County is an administrative area located in the former North Eastern Province of Kenya. Ethnic Somalis largely dominate the County. Six constituencies comprise Garissa County: Balambala Constituency, Garissa Township Lagdera Constituency, Fafi Constituency, Ijara Constituency, and Dadaab Constituency [14]. The choice of Garissa County was largely informed by the fact that the County has been a prime target of terrorist attacks with the worst case being attack on Garissa university campus in which 148 lives were lost. Alleged involvements of local Somali-Muslims in terror attacks within the area and their recruitment to join radicalized groups are some of the primary reasons why the researcher selected the area of study.

The target group included all Somali Muslims who are residents of Garissa County. The respondents were drawn from employees working in Garissa Police Station, employees at Garissa County Commissioner's Office, religious leaders at Aladhiya Mosque, and Somali Muslims working or studying at Garissa University College.

The study involved a sample of 400 respondents. The selection of sample was based on the formula proposed by Yamane T. [27]. The sample size was therefore derived as follows (1):

$$n = \frac{N}{1+N(e)^2}, \quad (1)$$

where n – Sample size required; N – Total study population; e – The level of precision.

$$n = \frac{623,060}{1+623,060(.05)^2} = 399.74 = 400 \text{ respondents.}$$

Stratified random sampling technique was used to select 400 respondents. 200 respondents were local Somali youths aged between 17 and 35 years and working or studying at Garissa University College. 100 respondents were Somali Muslim employees aged 36- 60 years and working in Provincial county administration's office in Garissa County, 40 respondents were various law enforcement personnel working in Garissa

County and 60 respondents were local leaders drawn from the area.

Out of the 400 selected respondents 50 were included in focus group discussions (FGD) while the other 350 were administered with questionnaires. Out of the 50 respondents selected for inclusion in FGDs, 20 were Police officers from Garissa county commander's office, 10 respondents were Muslim religious leaders drawn from Riyadhha Mosque and 20 respondents were Somali Muslim employees drawn from Provincial County Administration Office. The sampling distribution procedure has been illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1 – Table of Sample distribution procedure

Target Group	Number of Respondents
Garissa Police Station	40
Riyadha Mosque	60
Garissa County Administration Office	100
Garissa University College	200
Total	400

Information for this study was collected using questionnaires and Focus Group Discussions (FGD). The questionnaires were closed ended, or open ended. The survey questions were focused on the objectives and the aim of the research. Questionnaire was selected as the most preferable research instruments in this study because it is less costly and has minimal interference from the researcher, which reduces the responses bias by the respondent [12]. The respondents filled the questionnaires as the researcher waited and later collected them. All the questionnaires administered were, thus, collected back.

Qualitative information was collected using Focus Group Discussions. The FGD's involved key informants selected from the target population and who were considered to be information- rich in regards to the problem under study.

Once the data to be used in this study had been collected it was classified, compared and combined with empirical material from the FGDs and field notes to extract the meaning for a better understanding of the subject under study. Thereafter, the data units were combined according to the same topics or themes in order to produce a coherent meaning. Results were later presented

and recommendation drawn in line with the objectives and findings of the study.

In order to establish content validity, the researcher had to ensure that items on the questionnaires related to the two main constructs being measured (marginalization and radicalization). The validity of the research instruments was also established by submitting the research instruments to experts for evaluation. The questionnaire was submitted to a team of skilled researchers from Africa Nazarene University. The suggestions provided by the experts were used to develop and improve the research instruments before beginning the process of data collection. Furthermore, the instrument was piloted to a designated sample of Somali Muslims in Garissa County Commanders Station. Piloting was meant to improve the content validity of the instrument.

Reliability is when a particular measure yields the same results, under the same circumstances even when they are measured at different points [13]. The instruments' reliability was established using the spit-half method. Using this method the survey questionnaire was administered to two groups of respondents and a score was then calculated based on each half of the two scales. Great correlations between the two scales indicated that the questionnaire was reliable.

RESULTS

A total of 400 respondents (60 Muslim religious leaders in Garissa County, 40 law enforcement personnel, 100 government officials, and 200 local Somali from Garissa University College) fully completed and returned the questionnaires. Therefore the return rate of questionnaires used in the study was 100%, which was considered adequate to provide the information on marginalization and the rise in radicalization in Garissa County.

Results of the age of respondents are presented in Figure 1.

From the study, it was revealed that, majority of the respondents, 202 out of 400, were aged between 31 and 40 years. The respondents aged 18 to 30 years and those aged 41 to 54 were 114 and 84 respectively.

The results of the respondents' level of education are as illustrated in Table 2.




Figure 1 – Respondent's Age

Table 2 – Respondents' level of education

Level of Education	Frequency	Percentage
University	53	13
Tertiary college	133	33
A – level	67	17
O – level	147	37
Total	400	100

The study found that most of the employees working in Garissa county had basic education, with the majority, 144 out of 400 having attained 'O'- level of education. This was closely followed by 129 out of 400 respondents who had tertiary level of education. Those with 'A'- level of Education were 64 out of 400. 49 out of 400 had the highest level of qualifications, being a University degree.

To elicit response of Muslims views concerning radicalization, the respondents were asked whether they believed marginalization of Somali Muslim increased their likelihood of joining radicalized groups. The results of Somali Muslim views on radicalization in Garissa County are as shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2 – Somali Muslims views on radicalization in Garissa County

According to the results of the study, 276 out of 400 respondents strongly agreed that marginalization and profiling of Muslims affects their likelihood to join radicalized groups. 99 out of 400 respondents agreed with this position while only 25 respondents strongly disagreed with this position.

When the respondents were asked whether they thought the government had marginalized Somali Muslims in Garissa County, they gave the following responses:

"No. The introduction of County government has gone a long way in countering equality in resource allocation" (Participant 13).

"Yes. Accessing basic needs is still a challenge to us" (Participant 137).

"Yes. The government is still limiting the registration of Somali Muslims as Kenyan Citizens" (Participant 47).

"Yes. Garissa County is underdeveloped when compared to other counties in terms of road networks, education and health facilities" (Participant 82).

"Yes. The region has lagged behind for decades in terms of development" (Participant 58).

When the respondents were asked whether they thought some government policies contributed to marginalization of Somali Muslims, most of them agreed, claiming that the government's development policy was biased. They cited the fact that the government had not balanced development of institutions of higher learning in Garissa County as it had done in other Counties inhabited by non Somali populations. The presence of Garissa University College, as the only public university in Garissa County was particularly cited by respondents as indicative of inequality in development of educational infrastructure. Others cited policies on issuance of travel documents, Identity Cards and birth certificates, which they claimed took longer and sometimes they could not get. The respondents further said that there were instances where stop and searches policies enforced by police officers on patrol were mostly aimed at Somalis. Some of the respondents cited marginalization in regard to access to education and basic healthcare facilities.

Some of their responses were as follows:

"Yes. Investigative policies that focus on Somali Muslims as the prime targets of terror-related incidences" (Participant 72).

"Yes. Most often it is so difficult for a Somali Muslim youth to acquire a national I.D. Card. This in turn, leads to a sense of frustration and a feeling of alienation, which causes them to resort to terrorism through radicalization" (Participant 115).

"No. government policies are formulated with the national agenda in picture. The policies are not necessarily formulated with a certain region as the target" (Participant 72).

The respondents were then asked whether they thought the government had put any measures in place to reduce the rate of radicalization in Garissa County. Their responses were:

"Yes. The government is investing in public education" (Participant 63).

"Yes. Involving the public in policy formulation initiatives to address radicalization" (Participant 115).

"Yes. There are measures such as police undercover investigation. However, I feel some of the measures are not addressing the root cause of the problem. The government should be proactive and not reactive in addressing radicalization" (Participant 14).

When the respondents were asked to discuss some of the strategies which they thought the government should implement in order to prevent radicalization in Garissa County, they suggested that there was need to fast track the process of issuance of National Identity Cards to enable Somali Muslims who are Kenyan citizens to walk freely within the country, access viable opportunities of development and compete equally in the job market. Others emphasized on the need to establish more infrastructure such as educational institutions, healthcare facilities and roads to rural areas proportionately to attract more investors and enhance regional development.

The analysis of respondents' background information mainly focused on how their age and level of education was related to their responses and how these in turn affected the results of the study.

The age of the respondents was considered to be an important factor because people of different ages are affected differently by the problem of marginalization. The young people might be affected through lack of employment while the

older groups might be affected largely by lack of or inadequate healthcare facilities due to their deteriorating health. As revealed in figure 4.1, some of the emerging issues from examination of respondents of different age groups was the fact that the young respondents, particularly of ages 18-30 were concerned that marginalization had reduced opportunities of finding institutions of higher learning in Garissa.

One respondent pointed out that:

"Most private institutions have closed due to the threat of terror after Garissa University College attack and we do not have another public university" (Participant 365).

Youth respondents in the age of 18-30 were further concerned about restrictions brought about by increased security operations. For instance, one respondent stated that:

"I can no longer go out and enjoy club music with my friends at night..." (Participant 271).

Respondents in the ages between 31-40 were mostly concerned about lack of job opportunities. A young respondent in FGD expressed his frustration stating:

"Formal employment in Garissa is next to impossible! I have been applying for the last 2 years and I still don't have a job" (Participant 9).

From the study findings, it was therefore evident that the older generations (41-54 years old) were largely concerned about developmental agenda including the ability of the government to meet certain necessities such construction of roads to improve accessibility and build healthcare facilities. On the contrary, young respondents were particularly concerned about fewer opportunities of education especially in institutions of higher learning. In their view, opportunities of higher learning were important since most employment opportunities that have better remunerations and other benefits require a minimum of college education.

The level of education was an important consideration because people of different levels of education have different conceptualization of issues. One of the emerging issues with regard to the level of education was the fact that most educated persons tended to give a more critical ex-

planation to the questions. For example, one respondent observed that:

"...it is true the government may not meet the pertinent needs of a community or region, but I don't think this can in itself explain radicalization because then we would have radicalized groups in Ukambani, Turkana, or some parts of Nyanza, which lack basic necessities such as water, electricity and roads...I think these are predisposing conditions" (Participant 26).

Another respondent with a university education observed that:

"While research on underemployment and radicalization tend to point to youth who are frustrated and who become instruments to be used by extremists like ISIS, Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab, I think these youths have no alternative sources to vent their frustration or avenues to use their energy..." (Participant 5).

On the contrary the less educated gave a superficial explanation to the problem of radicalization, sometimes based on their feelings rather than logic. For example, one respondent while explaining his views concerning radicalization stated:

"I think radicalization is not evil if you only focus on enemy in war, who want to kill you" (Participant 48).

"This is unfair, only Muslims are marginalized!" (Participant 4).

From the study findings respondents with lower academic qualifications were less likely to interrogate issues and provide critical examination of issues raised. Their understanding of the pertinent problem was more superficial and likely in-

hibited by strong emotional feelings. On the contrary respondents with higher levels of academic achievements argued their position on issues, sometimes drawing support from authoritative sources. The varied approach engendered by respondents from different educational background was, thus, important in data analysis and deriving conclusions.

Inferential statistics. Inferential statistics analyses the quantitative findings based on the hypotheses of the study. The analysis involves testing the null hypotheses and rejecting or accepting them.

The first hypothesis of this study was:

H₀(1): There is no statistically significant relationship between radicalization and Somali Muslims' access to basic health, education and Employment opportunities.

In order to test this hypothesis the researcher carried out a chi-square test of independence on responses to questionnaire. The researcher wanted to test whether there was a statistically significant relationship between radicalization in Garissa county and equal access to basic health, education, and employment opportunities.

The null hypothesis for the test was that there was no relationship between radicalization in Garissa County and Somali Muslim access to basic health, education and employment opportunities. The results of the test are tabulated in Table 3.

The chi-square test in Table 4 shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between radicalization in Garissa County and perceived inequality in access to basic health, education and employment opportunities (X-Square = 9.39, DF=1, $p < 0.032$).

Table 3 – Relationship between radicalization and access to education, health and Employment opportunities (cross-tabulation)

		Do you think Somali Muslims have equal access to basic health, education opportunities employment opportunities as other Muslims and other religious groups?		Total
		Yes	No	
Do you think radicalization is a potential problem in Garissa County?	Yes	99.2	88.8	188.0
	No	111.8	100.2	212.0
Total		211.0	189.0	400.0

Table 4 – Chi-Square Tests of Relationship between radicalization and access to education, health and Employment opportunities

Chi-Square Tests	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9.39a	1	.032		
Continuity Correction ^b	7.55	1	.038		
Likelihood Ratio	9.40	1	.032		
Fisher's Exact Test				.036	.019
Linear-by-Linear Association	9.37	1	.033		
N of Valid Cases	400				

Notes: a) 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 88.83; b) Computed only for a 2x2 table.

The strength of this relationship is given in the Asymmetric measures in Table 5.

Table 5 – Symmetric measure of Relationship between radicalization and access to education, health and Employment opportunities

Symmetric Measures		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.248	.032
	Cramer's V	.248	.033
N of Valid Cases		400	

Phi value of 0.248 shows a moderate relationship indicating a strong association.

The first null hypothesis which stated that there is no statistically significant relationship between radicalization and Somali Muslims' access to basic health, education and employment opportunities was therefore rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted implying that inequitable access to basic health, education and employment opportunities by Somali Muslims is related to radicalization.

H₀(2): There is no statistically significant relationship between unemployment or underemployment and radicalization of Somali Muslims. The results are shown in Table 6.

Table 6 – Relationship between unemployment / underemployment and Radicalization

	Radicalization
Unemployment or Underemployment	r = 0.708** p = .000

Table 6 shows a significant positive correlation ($r = .708$, $p = .000$) unemployment or underemployment and radicalization. Therefore the hypothesis that “there is no statistically significant relationship between unemployment or underemployment and radicalization of Somali Muslims”, was rejected. This shows that there is statistically significant relationship between unemployment or underemployment and radicalization of Somali Muslims. The implication is that access to employment opportunities may reduce the chances of Somali Muslims being radicalized while reduction in such opportunities may increase their likelihood of becoming radicalized.

H₀(3): There is no statistically significant relationship between government policies in Garissa county and radicalization of Somali Muslims.

In order to test this hypothesis the researcher carried out a chi-square test of independence on responses to questionnaire. The researcher tested whether there was a statistically significant relationship between radicalization in Garissa county and government policies. The null hypothesis for the test was that there was no statistically significant relationship between radicalization in Garissa County and government policies in Garissa County. The results are tabulated in Table 7.

The chi-square test in Table 8 shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between radicalization in Garissa County and perceived inequality in access to basic health, education and employment opportunities (X-Square = 7.88, $DF=1$, $p < 0.05$).

Table 7 – Relationship between radicalization and government policies (cross-tabulation)

		Do you think radicalization is a potential problem in Garissa County?		Total
		Yes	No	
Do you believe that some government policies contribute to marginalization of Somali Muslims?	Yes	87.4	98.6	186.0
	No	100.6	113.4	214.0
Total		188.0	212.0	400.0

Table 8 – Chi-square test of Relationship between radicalization and government policies

Chi-Square Tests	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (2-sided)	Exact Sig. (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	7.88a	1	.0375		
Continuity Correction ^b	6.20	1	.0431		
Likelihood Ratio	7.89	1	.0375		
Fisher's Exact Test				.422	.216
Linear-by-Linear Association	7.86	1	.0375		
N of Valid Cases	400				

Notes: a) 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 87.42; b) Computed only for a 2x2 table.

The strength of this relationship is given in the Asymmetric measures Table 9.

Table 9 – Chi-square test of Relationship between radicalization and government policies

Symmetric Measures		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.344	.038
	Cramer's V	.344	.038
N of Valid Cases		400	

Phi value of 0.344 shows a moderate relationship indicating a strong association.

Therefore the hypothesis that “there is no statistically significant relationship between government policies and radicalization of Somali Muslims”, was rejected. This shows that there is statistically significant relationship between government policies and radicalization of Somali Muslims. The implication is that access to employment opportunities may reduce the chances of Somali Muslims being radicalized while reduction in such opportunities may increase their likelihood of becoming radicalized.

DISCUSSION

According to the study findings, most respondents were of the opinion that radicalization stemmed from the political, economic, and social marginalization of Somali Muslims. These findings are consistent with previous studies, which have established that marginalization influences

people's social lives. For example, Saucier G., Shen-Miller S., and Stankov L. [23] researched the effects of social exclusion on social activities. They found that experiences of supposed exclusion or discrimination can prompt aggression and anger in people. Their study also established that individuals confer tremendous importance to stable, enduring social affiliations and that there is a strong need to belong experienced by human beings. The authors concluded that rejection and social exclusion lead to susceptible egotism, giving rise to mental states of aggression and anger. More so, they discovered that social exclusion undermines pro-social actions [23], and escalates aggressive actions, even when the object and source of aggression are different. This outcome may look like its counterintuitive; nevertheless, it denotes that being left out fosters the compulsion for broad retaliation. Dalcoura K. [9] postulated that the pursuit of egotism is an essential underlying impetus for suicide.

Kenyan-Somali and Muslims' exclusivity from access to benefits enshrined in Kenya's constitution indicates a shocking void of people lacking identity [19]. Their historical exclusion has led to a perception of being fewer Kenyans within the community. The unchanging perception of playing second-fiddle citizens to the other Kenyans persists. Though they are native Kenyans, they experience alien treatment from fellow Kenyans and especially the police. Moreover, this view has seen them regarded as extremists who perpetrate violent attacks. In an instance, Kenyan-

Somali nationals and Somalis were attacked by citizens of Kenya who turned against them in the aftermath of detonation of explosives on November 8, 2012, in Nairobi's Eastleigh area. However, this was not the first instance in which Somalis received a rejection. Following a grenade explosion at St. Polycarp church on November 30, 2012, culminating into the death of a child and injuries to nine others, an enraged mob attacked Somalis in Eastleigh with stones and sticks, in an incident that led to thirteen Somalis sustaining injuries and property loss [19].

Individuals have interactions with the environment. Their knowledge of the world influences perceptions and responses to the phenomenon around them. This awareness of reality, no matter accurate it is, impacts their behavior. The subjective interpretation by people of what is society, as opposed to the objective truth, may bring about terrorism and radicalization [11]. However, conforming to radical explanations of religious conviction is an indicator rather than a basis of radicalization. Krueger A. and Laitin D. [16] argued that people contrast in the range to which they are in want of cognitive cessation, which denotes the preference for definitive structure and order, and a yearning for stable and well-founded knowledge. Individuals who need closure strongly were found to have a lower tolerance of ambiguity, appear less willing to experience, more apt to dogmatism and authoritarianism [16], and more disposed to espouse traditionalist ideology. With intergroup situations, closure positively stemmed from the yearning for consensus in in-groups as well as the rejection coming from people holding diverged opinions. When the desire for closure is strengthened, individuals focus on the in-group to seek satisfaction and gratification. Accordingly, in-group partiality, together with an out-group derogation, intensifies with the wish for instantaneous and lasting information. Without a doubt, Miriti G., Mugambi M., & Ochieng R. [19] gathered that craving for closure had a definite relation to identifying with the in-group as well as the receipt of attitudes and beliefs of in-group members. Recently, Alao A. and Jaye T. [3] submitted that the prerequisite for cognitive closure adds to 'group-centrism,' a pattern of behavior that comprises in-group preferential, rejection of different, the preservation of group standards, pressures to attitude homogeneity and the encouragement of autocratic leadership. Significantly, beyond being

just a personal trait, the necessity for closure similarly deviates as a role of the circumstances.

Certain particular circumstances, such as disorders, mental fatigue, or time pressure, can bring the incentive for cognitive closure. Nonetheless, such beliefs can turn out to be entrenched in a person's mindset and become a powerful influence after radicalization.

Xenophobic attacks and treatment of Somali people as aliens have further increased their lack of sense of belonging. Consequently, this has enhanced the opportunities of Somalis joining the extremist groups to find a perfect fit. A culture of inclusion needs to be there when handling and responding to violence to bring change since, in most cases, these terror attackers are unidentified owing to their tactics of concealing themselves within the masses when attacking. Thus, attacking a group is ineffective as well as unproductive [8]. A real threat is, in effect, unavoidable, that the uninvolved in the victim communities could see sense in defending and protecting themselves against the "alien," thus pushing people to extremism.

The ostracizing or wrong treatment of people tends to influence them to behave with hostility towards others, although they were the source of their maltreatment or not. Ostracizing also leads to the reduction of pro-social behavior in their lives [20]. Ostracizing finds credence alongside the hypothesis that individual experiences of discrimination against self or instances of rejection often influence a person's tendency to fall into radicalization.

The process of radicalization is grounded in macro-level elements of society, such as foreign policy, global developments in the realms of culture, politics and the economy, and integration. The formation and blending of people around a social identity predate the radicalization process and serves to form the group's status as per the self-categorization theory.

Radicalization is fuelled by aspects of everyday living such as reduced integration, the perceived 'War against Islam' discrimination, and other societal factors that predispose people to the thought that they are threatened as a society [18]. It creates the element of an 'in-group,' people joined by race, religion, feeling threatened by an 'out-group.' The social dynamics predicate the dealings with members of the 'in-group' with favor.' At the same time, the 'out-group' is dealt

with in a derogatory manner, which often translates to violence against them as opined in the social identity theory espoused by Rakodi C., Gatabaki-Kamau R., and Devas N. [22] and Lazear E. [18]. Individual threat Factors such as strained personal relationships, disorders, and life's pressures affect an individual's ability to develop cognitive closure. These factors exacerbate the need for immediate and permanent information to the group, making the individual(s) eschew those values which the group espouses while rejecting those of the out-group [20]. The threats coming from religious leaders, family, peers, and the media may motivate victims to take action. In some rare cases, the individual has already decided that violence is the most appropriate means of dealing with the threat. Resorting to violence is not the norm, as the belief system might advocate for pacifist solutions to the same problem. The belief system that influences an individual's choice is dependent on sources of information, affecting individuals in society and character traits forming the individual.

Regardless of these factors, the element of coincidence cannot be ruled out as meetings with people, and our interaction with them is governed more by chance than design. In addition to these situations in life might act as triggers as they affect the individual, social and public spheres leading one to opt for violence. Khalil J. and Zeuthen M. posited that acts of terrorism could and are often preceded by factors that call for vengeance or provoke the out-group against the in-group [15]. In the change towards radicalization, behavioral change is evident in individuals who have undergone ideological transformation replacing their belief system with another one, which purportedly provides solutions to the problems be-devilling them. The entry of one individual into radicalization attracts and pulls in new converts into the group [24]. This mode of radicalization is classified under a type that draws its strengths from social dynamics.

The social context provides various reasons by which people may be radicalized. These include social pressure, group's norms, social identification, and affection to the group. In these groups, groups' processes and interactions and not radical ideologies lead people to radicalization. These processes are rooted in the micro-level in the individual and social spheres, as opposed to the macro-level [24]. Hence radicalization is likely to start as a product of social concerns rather than the mainstream belief that ideological interests

cause it. It is when variant causal factors are embedded in an original context that the population might become radicalized; that is whether inherent identity concerns might be tied into a fertile ground for radical beliefs to fester. Social interaction dynamics play a very central role in explaining how people can step in the late phases of radicalization. Hence the likelihood of being radicalized depends on interaction with a radicalized person.

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of the study was to examine Somali Muslims' views on marginalization and rise of radicalization in Kenya. The research utilized correlational research design. The data was collected using questionnaires and Focus Group Discussions. The analysis involved descriptive and inferential statistics. The data was presented in form of tables, figures and charts. The analysis of data revealed that most respondents believed that marginalization of Somali Muslim increased their likelihood of joining radicalized groups. According to the respondents, some of the causes of radicalization include: discrimination in employment, in-group identity, Limited access to education and the need to address grievances. The respondents further identified terrorism, and increased school drop-outs as some of the primary effects of upsurge in radicalization.

This study recommends that the Government must address perceived grievances and other factors that cause social, economic and political exclusion. Secondly, the government should engage all communities in capacity building programs that foster inclusivity and empowerment.

Dealing with regional disparities in Kenya demands a fresh approach could involve the formulation and implementation of policies and programmes based on equity, as well as the design and actualization of an integrated regional development framework. Legal reforms would be necessary to create a more cohesive framework for addressing regional inequities while a robust monitoring framework will come in handy in the monitoring of the achievement of key indicators and milestones of balanced regional development. Further, recognizing the various players in regional development is critical. A possible pitfall is the absence of effective coordination mechanisms, which could severely impede efforts to promote balanced regional development.

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